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More than just what nation states or supranational political bodies such as the EU mayclaim
and stand for in regard to citizenship, citizenship is evidently a political practice, and hence,
not a being but becoming — in the way people identify themselves and one another, use
political rights, and ask newrights and denysome decisions made bypoliticians and states on
their behalf. Not surprisingly, citizenship politics has become central in influencing public
debates, social and political change, and international relations, the way social movements are
being formed, even our own personal lives and how they fit into the political community.
This has been associatedwith the increasedmobilityof people across the world.
The increasedandintensifiedflowof people on a global scale has brought together otherwise
unrelated individuals and communities with different cultural structures and practices in
previously constructed common social spaces such as nation-states or, as in the case of the
EU, a supranational regional polity. This has created several issues among which the challenge
to construct a newcitizenship structure accommodative of diversitywithin alreadyconstructed
social spaces occupies a primaryposition. This involves not onlymaking people of such social
spaces develop certain attitudes and gain knowledge of how other people in other cultures
attach meaning to their social actions but also imaginatively create a new mood of citizenship
enabling individuals to undertake their social, political and economic roles as active citizens.
No doubt, the latter is a cultural condition for social coherence to the benefit of both the
polity as a whole and citizens as particular individuals. What is socially needed, among other
things, is a culturally constructed novel frame of mind of belongingness to a political
communitythat can provide citizeris with an assured belief in and affection for an expanding
multicultural citizenship context. This must, of course, be part of both the ongoing processes
of structural reconfiguration of citizenship systems, which aim at eliminating discriminator)7
politico-legal regulations as well as the transformation of social practices, which are disposed
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To put it differently, the inflowof people with different cultural backgrounds into existing
political communities has not onlyresulted in growing cultural diversitybut also created a
practical question in regard to howthe «newcomers»and the «natives»can be affectionately
connected with" one another and with the newdiversified polityas a whole. This paper
attempts to elaborate on the significant role of emotions in general and love in particular in
the process of «fusion»of differences within the common life of citizens.
In what follows, we emphasize that citizens are not onlylegal agents who have the rights to
obtain and exercise political power but also moral agents whose sense of life derive from
their attachments and engagements with the pursuits and relationships that they regard
morally right. Citizenship provides a context for a meaningful life by which individuals
choose and pursue moral precepts. Morality, which is an indispensable part of citizenship,
makes life worth living. Onlymorallymotivated individuals can see a meaning in their lives.
Individuals, who feel attached to one another, construct symbols in social interaction for
expressing meaningful, if not rational, causality in their relationships. In other words,
symbols by providing meaningful signs for social relationships render life purposeful and
intentional. For those who enter a «foreign» citizenship context as new «citizens» as well as
for those native minorities who are perceived as «different», this creates an ontological
problem. Unless they share in the symbolic system of the new context, they shall not find
any significant purpose in their life. Thus the question is: howcan they recognize the moral
connotations of the newcitizenship?
We begin with the observation that political, social and cultural practices of a particu-
lar citizenship while enabling the recognized members of the community to interact on the
basis of a shared and valued set of meanings, they exclude the presents such as immigrants
by enclosing the interaction in the public sphere only for the signs and symbols of the
former. This is, in fact, the closure of communication among the citizens with respect to a
particular moral system. In this sense, as a particular life-world, actual existing citizenships
need to confront the problem of fusing the moral beings of the unknown presents into
the daily lives of the established presents and make them feel attached to the political
community and see that the recognized citizens acknowledge the moral freedom of
newcomers. We argue that in so far as this impediment is not overcome, the affective dis-
connectedness among the so-called «legal» or «technical» citizens shall persist and result in
the denial of the moral freedom of all citizens. Needless to say, onlythose whose moral free-
dom is respected can respect the moral order of citizenship. This means that if newcomers
see their interactions with the established citizens as an affectionate relationship; if they are
granted the confidence to accomplish several goals that, they think, are intrinsically adding
up to the common life of their political community; if they believe that there is value in
living in the new community; if they see beauty and reason in their new communal rituals,
festivities, national and religious holidays, works of art and science, heroes and heroines
etc, they shall feel responsible as citizens and actively participate in the doings of citizens-
hip. In the absence of such a sense of life they are more likely to be driven into estrange-
ment and distancing from moral responsibility for the citizenship. The problem here is not
their lack of moral values but the absence of affection with any shared morality. This is to
say that citizenship is built on and expanded on the basis of affective connection between
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people. In other words, citizenship is invested in the political community by value affections
to it.
A model of ideal citizenship: Citizenas a member of a moral community
The concept of citizenship understood commonlyas legal membership of a state has become
a problematic notion in political discussions. The waythe notion of citizenship is a conceptua-
lized change with the emphases being put on different aspects of political, social, cultural and
economic conditions. Once certain aspects of these conditions are prioritized at the expense
of others, the evolving concepts generate a range of different views of citizenship. These views
can be separated from one another mainly according to how they consider the major com-
ponents of citizenship. Among the principal views the ones that focus on such components
as «citizenship as identity», «citizenship as affective connections, «citizenship as system of
rights», and «citizenship as self-government* as well as «political and civic participation* are
relevant to our present inquiry(Aristotle 1976: 258-311, 1992:162-173; Kant 1930, 1997: 13, 20;
Locke, 1993: 164; Marshall, 1950; Parsons 1959; Rousseau, 1988: 93). These views of citi-
zenship, however theydiffer fromone another, are also interrelatedbecause all of themaimto
understand, describe, and explain what defines one as a citizen; who is a citizen; and what
forms of citizenship at different levels can enrich our perception of problematic discussions
and interpretations of citizenship. In that sense, they are as much theoretical inquiries as
being political quests for practical projects for rejuvenating citizenship in the midst of diver-
sity. Surely, among the major political philosophers of citizenship, Aristotle was the first one,
who influenced much of the understanding and practice of citizen and citizenship not onlyin
his own times but also since then. For the sake of brevity, our discussion on the necessary
conditions for an ideal model of citizenship rests primarilyon his accounts.
Aristotle defined citizenship as active membership of a political community, which involves
affective connections amongparticipants with reference to specific qualities i.e. virtue andvalues
such as equality and justice and capacities of «friendship» presupposing that association
(Aristotle 1976: 273-274 and 286-311 and 1992: 176-82). Friendship-like connections make it
possible for people to carry out citizenship functions not only for forming citizenship as a
historical political entity but also for bringing into being some type of commonly shared prac-
tical knowledge of citizenship constructed in a particular space and time (Giddens, 1984:2). In
other words, the citizen can be characterized with the exclusive quality or virtues of fri-
endship for making political community and political functions in constitutive of practices of
citizenship. In this conception, citizens are largely defined by their relationship with political
community and having affective connection to it. In this sense, it is not incorrect to suggest
that Aristotle formed his understanding of ideal-form of citizenship through reasoning from
the precondition of affective connections among a group of people and concluded it in terms
of the same precondition (Aristotle 1976: 274).
The Aristotelian precondition for ideal-form of citizenship implicitlyposits a difficult relation
between citizens andtheir political communitybecause it draws attention to acomplicated
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question, that is, there is no citizen without citizenship andvice versa (Aristotle 1992:183). Yet
these two are also different for the apparent reason that they have their own self-
determining existence. So the question turns out to be what quality each side must
encompass in order to have, as Giddens puts it, a duality of the two (Giddens, 1984). When
we combine the issue of duality with the Aristotelian precondition for ideal-form of
citizenship, identifying the emotionallyminimum necessarycondition for the constitution of
citizenship by citizens gains an utmost significance. To begin with, we must admit that
political communities exist prior to citizens; and this always presupposes a form of affective
bond among citizens who are born into it. In this structural relationship, agencyof citizens,
i.e., their capacity to reproduce as well as transform citizenship, requires an ongoing social
construction of affective connections among citizens. Citizens in turn can achieve the latter
if their citizenship as a socio-cultural milieu not only appears to them as a system of rights,
responsibilities and freedoms but also a social space of common life.
To talk about a society is to talk about people who do reproduce, cultivate and transform
political, social, cultural and economic relations that are necessary for reproducing and sus-
taining their common life. In this set up, in becoming aware of one's own self qua citizen,
one must feel included in the common life of political community and its institutions
(Arsitotle 1992: 183-185). This is to say that citizenship and its institutions, first and
foremost, must provide citizens with a feeling of solidarity. Having such a feeling, citizens
as social-cultural agents, actively involve in socially practiced morals and rules. Much of
characteristics of their sense of being in terms of justice, respect, perception of the good and
rights are results of engagement with the moral order of citizenship. Thus, the moral order
does not only identify a set of exclusive qualities of «virtue» cementing citizens but also
appear to be a practical necessityof active citizenship.
Aristotle sees relationships in a political communityas actions toward one another because
people are political bytheir nature and valuable because of division of labor, which is neces-
sary for the production of their material and social life. There are different sorts of citizens
in a political community each of whom must provide some «good» for the rest. What one
citizen provides for others must be no more valuable than what theyreceive— otherwise; as
we shall see in the next section, they'll lose their moral responsibilities and get alienated from
their citizenship (Aristotle, 1992:104-105). In this context, Aristotle considers political com-
munity an affiliated and mutually beneficial network of interdependent people who as citi-
zens share what is requisite for forming and sustaining a common life. A common life can
be sustained in a variety of ways, including bond created or sustained by reciprocity, care,
liking, mores, politics or economic exchange—or some combinations of these. Language,
symbols, and artifacts characteristically mediate these bonds as what we may call «enablers»
(Wittgenstein 1953:88-92). It is thus important to note that barring the fusion of certain
symbols of some citizens into the common life of citizens by framing them as «foreign» is to
disable those people in their capacity as citizens. This may lead such people to develop a
sense of distrust and a feeling of being humiliated and discriminated, and therebybeing less
prone to devote themselves to the goals and common problems and issues of their
political community.
With the emphasis on the functions and the role of citizenship, Aristotle recognizes the
necessityof mutual devotion in the service of a good life, for the sake of attaining a perfect
and self-sufficing existence (Aristotle, 1992:176-183). He thus underlines the significance of
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moral agencyof citizens as a virtue in itself, which can bestowthem with moral duties, respon-
sibilities, and commitment to the common life from within their self-determining existence
(Aristotle 1976: 91-110). The virtue of moral agency derives from its social inclination toward
sustaining the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness among citizens. Citizens whose moral
agency is recognized support and strengthen the sense of belonging to the political commu-
nity. In doing so, they help develop a social milieu in which the concrete experience of being
politically enabled becomes practical knowledge. As a matter of fact, citizens cannot wish for
the good of their community unless there is such practical knowledge on their part. Here we
notice again the central role of affections because without having widespread sense of recip-
rocity and solidarity among citizens, they can neither practice their moral agency nor gain the
experiential confidence in beingenabledbytheir citizenship.
In short, to conclude this part, we can suggest that the legal bond of citizenship acquires a
practical existence as longas there is mutual trust amongcitizens (Cooper 1999 356-377). This
is to saythat being a citizen is to trust one another and also in relation to the others that come
towards or within it. In this context, trust is more essential than any other emotion in a
political community of citizens. The spontaneous emergence of expectation of good from
others indicates the intermediation of a political community at work through the actions of
citizens. The quality of relations within a political community can be assessed by the existence
of felt interdependence on the part of citizens. It is this felt interdependence and not the for-
mal institutions of citizenship that keep alive a kind of solidarity by which citizens become
aware of the power andobligation to act for each other.
Citizenship as it actually exists: belongingto a nation
As it actually exists, contemporary citizenship is closely linked to the territorial-state and its
claim to represent the common interests of its inhabitants. One of the claims that the territo-
rial state makes in regard to the common interest is the national interest. Either explicitly or
implicitly most of the territorial states identify the people belonging to its regulatory power
structure as the «nation» that allegedly shares a common faith, if not a past, present or future.
Although the states's «national» sovereignty has recently been circumscribed by the nascent
multilayered global governance regimes, the nation state is still the most dominant form of
territoriality (Oncu-Ko a^n, 2001: 45-46)). Not surprisingly, among the «common» citizens,
too, seeing citizenship as the political form of the nation is still pervasive in all parts of the
world. This is why in the life-world of various contemporary citizenships people consider the
state the protector of their rights based on the idea of the separation of nationals from non-
nationals bycertain exclusive rights. As a result, citizens driven by various forms of nationalist
ideologies expect to see that their state fulfils some functions to preserve the unity (sometimes
«purity») of the nation (Breuilly1982: 393; Balibar, 1991, 1995: 45 and Lefort 1986: 191). First
of all, they always have an unambiguous and exclusivist demand for the formal definition of
who the citizen is (Yuvai-Davis, 1997). In practical terms this means that they want to be
assured about the formal definition of the citizenship and demand from their
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state to be sensitive to the boundaries of the separation between «them» and «the others».
Needless to say, this demand is an integral part of the socially and historically constructed
ideology of citizenship, and hence may differ in its peculiarities from one context to anot-
her.
Nevertheless, almost all «nationally» constructed citizenships rests on some form of nati-
onalist discourse that allows its followers to make sense of their commonality, and thereby
enable them to fix their «being» with reference to the transcendental category of the nation.
This not only legitimizes the monopolization of power within the territoriality by the state
but also gives people an existential comfort and social security. Sartre calls such deceptive
existential illusions bad faith. Bad faith is a practice by virtue of which one comes to know
oneself yet at the same time hides it from oneself. As Sartre precisely puts it, bad faith is «a
double activity in the heart of unity.» (Sartre, 1998: 53) Seen from this light, bad faith appe-
ars to be a practice of distraction (Sartre, 1998: 54). Those who practice bad faith distract
their consciousness from their experiences of «what they are» (e.g. being human) to show
themselves «what they are not» (e.g. a Turk, a German, an American etc.). They do this not
scornfully but in full concurrence with themselves. Anything that disturbs bad faith such as
the incorporation of some «outsiders» into the formal citizenship may create an existential
dissonance, which can be resolved by heightening the ideological «purity», i.e. strengthening
the belief in the deception. If one fails in doing so, this may lead to a feeling of insecurity.
It is at such moments the so-called nationals may be inclined to disregard the extension of
formal definition of citizenship to newcomers and reduce it to an «elite» identity by which
they make the new condition compatible with their «nationalist» ideology. Thus, one can
hear or read in various media in the life-world: «Theyare just guest workers». «Theyare not
one of us but immigrants». «He is not one of us because his parents are foreigners». In other
words, while the composition of the citizens sociallyand culturallybeing expanded as a result
of formal inclusion of non-nationals, the socio-psychological drives of the established
citizens mayreinforce the idea of citizenship as belonging to a nation.
Sometimes such socio-psychological reactions may reach the level of abhorrence. Surely,
such feelings of disgust are much more uncommon than the banal nationalism that allows
people to express their felt superiority to non-nationals in «civil» manners. The following
quotations from some web pages can showhowstrong and «un-civil»the nationalist bias and
reaction can be in creating the denial of the changing composition and meaning of
citizenship.2 With an apology to our readers we cite the following extreme messages in order
to emphasize what we want to drawattention to:
... is a turk and germans call the dirtyturks, "KunKun".
Butamongtheforeignersingermany, thesedirtyturksarecalled"donerkebabs". Wenevercall themturks.
Turk womenaremostlyprostitutes. Theysit intheprostitutehouses called Pasha heims. Wenever call them
turk prostitutes. We call them"doner kebab prostitutes".
Turk womenare "kunkunprostitutes". Turk women
are"doner kebab prostitutes".
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HeyDeutschland, makeyourself free fromthesedonerkebab prostitutes.
The quotation is full with cultural connotations. Turks are «kun kuns» and «doner kebaps»;
and they sit in «pasha heims». Of course, the claim is that none of this is part of the German
society and culture. Thus it is possible to cry out: «Hey Deutschland» clean «yourself» from
these foreigners! The interesting thing to notice in the message is the call to the nation for the
preservation of the purity of the nation. It is as if one is asked to scrub the «germs» from his/
her bodyin order to protect his/her health.
The person who expresses these views divides the life-world into two halves, those who are
loved and those who are abhored. In another message the «doner kebaps» are asked not only
to be moved out from «Deutschland» but also from «Europe» as a whole - without of course
defining the boundaries of Europe. The message written by another person who did not indi-
cate his ethnic identityreads as follows:
There are too many"doner kebab" turks inGermany. Germans should get rid of themand sendthemback
totheir turkey. MuslimTurkeyhasnoplaceintheEU & theyarenotwelcomedhere.
I work with the Germans and respect them greatly. But I have no respect for the doner kebabs and their
"donerkebab prostitutes".
I alsosupport theGermanswhentheycall the turkskunkun. MuslimTurkeyout of
Europe.
Here we read that the «author» works with «Germans» and «respect them greatly». This shows
that the person is a respectful citizen. He is a moral «person». He is also a well functioning
member of his community, as he participates in the economy as a productive person. Yet the
same moral person loses his human senses and without giving any particular reason other than
«doner kebap»call out to his fellow«European»friends to move «Turks»out of «Europe». It is
not difficult to see that the latter is a demand for a radical change in the citizenship policy of
the German state. This political demand shows us that citizenship as belonging to a nation is a
strong practical knowledge in the middle of the «civilized Europe», which is getting ready to
unite millions of citizens of 25 nation-states as European citizens. This is a serious issue
because the abhorrence against the «other»legitimated bythe belief in citizenship as belonging
to a nation triggers the abhorrence on the part of the «other». As the followingmessage reveals,
a «doner kebap »in response to the above quotedmessage claims that:
Germans don't hate Turks and Muslims, they hate anybody not German. A lot of British friends
(emphasis is added) of mine told me straight,". .., Germans are bloody ....!! Whyyou want
to live aroundthose Nazi pigs?" I told them I amaddictedto ... andthat Germany, despite
the fact that theyare . .. have the best.... in Europe. ...
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Miss Germany2004 is half Persian and half Muslim. I bet the Germans are usingher as some
kind of "Hey you Muslim guys, I'm gonna parade around your best women ... Kind of a sick
mind game that only a German can think of.»
The message indicates clearly that those whose moral beings are denied not only put the
accent on the feeling of disgust about the so-called nationals but also seem to somewhat
enjoy humiliating and insulting them. The message makes the degrading claim that the so-
called Europeans cannot make a unified community of individuals. Thus, the only reason
why one stays in Europe is the benefits it offers. We can almost hear this person saying:
«There is no such thing as respect and love in this «sick minded» community. This society
offers «me» the «best» in terms of such and such; and in so far as I keep getting it there is a
reason for me to stay. I am here for my personal good and I do not care the rest.» But isn't
it true to think that this individual is also saying: «I am not a moral person.»
Definitely, lack of affections and feelings of friendship and love leads to a hierarchical
ordering of individuals according to ethnicity, nationality and race. The following messages
are indicative of this hierarchical ordering of citizens:
Indians should go back to India. These people are rat eaters. They have no connection with
Germans. Did you all knowthat Indians are lowlife people?
The real part of history is that, Germans are Aryan people who have migrated (@ 3000 yrs
BC) from the INDUS valley to Europe. Similarlyaround 75% of Indians are Aryans. That's
why these people have some kind of similarity (emphasis is added). For thousand of years
Aryans have conquered the world, so they are proud of themselves. But sometimes it has led to
some of these people becomingegoist and not acceptingothers to be equal.
It is just one step from abhorrence to feeling superior to those being abhored. This is not
surprising because all forms of «hate» relationships rest on the superior-inferior type of
inequalitybetween the parties to the relationship. In this sense, once hatred is fed into the life
world, then the condition of equality, one of the indispensable pillars of citizenship, is
anhilliated in practice. The absence of practical equality in opposition to legal or technical
equality among the citizens results in one groups' claim over the possession of the state or
political authority in exclusion of other groups. Once citizens are divided by any privilege
such as nationals in opposition to non-nationals, they shall divide themselves into superiors
and inferiors and either be terrified of or hate each other. All this shall take them to the
search for establishing an authoritarian government to «manage their affairs*. Returning to
the message «Muslim Turks out of Europe,» the pressing question thus becomes: Who is
going to make this? What must be done politically so that some groups from the political
communityare forcefullyor rather violentlyremoved? But more importantly, howis such an
act going to be morally legitimated? Here the point is to see that the yearning for an
oppressive ruling on the part of the privileged nationals ensuing from the feeling of
superiority feeds the mood of revulsion on all sides of the social interaction. In other words,
all citizens regardless of their identities lose their «moral»characters.
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Aperceivedinequalityat the expense of some collectivepersonaswithin the communityof citizens
is to isolate some individuals based on a reference to dissimilarity. This is because equality,
among others, refers to a group of different individuals as if they share at least one thing in
common. To say, for example, that men and women are equal is to say that they are both
human. In this sense, inequalitycreates the social condition that different groups of people are
not perceived to be able to share a similarity. Yet if people are not similar in at least one trait
how come they live a common life as citizens? That is why there must be a constant
determination for struggle against inequalityin increasinglydiversifiedcitizenship contexts. The
need is thus to subvert any claim to privilege and superiority, whether this be ideational or
material, in order for constructing a citizenship as political community that can help indi-
viduals feel morallyresponsible andfree.
In the construction of citizenship as belonging to a nation - i.e. the dominant form of
citizenship as it actually exists - the so-called nationals are granted the symbolic capacity to
deny and alienate those signified as non-nationals. In this context non-nationals usually face
the challenge to come to terms with the alleged superiority of nationals and cope with the
social and personal troubles of being inferior by suppressing their true feelings. They usually
choose to play the role of inferior while indicating all forms of distrust to their superiors.
For example they choose to not to socialize with nationals or establish their enclaves within
the society of nationals. This is usually associated with the confusion in regard to their choice
of inhabitance: «Why are we here? How can we heal this pain and doubt?» Utilitarian
explanations are usuallyof help for them because theyalways want to be reimbursed for their
perceived loss of pride and equality. Thus, they claim that they just benefit from nationals to
the best of their power. Over time they become skilled at rationalizing their choice of being
inferior citizens with reference to being choiceless. The feeling of being foreigners is
reinforcedandtransferredto the next generations through socialization within the enclaves.
In contrast, in the Aristotelian ideal construction of citizenship as belonging to a moral
community, differences among nationals and non-nationals lose any symbolic reference to
superiority/inferiority. Here citizens are uniformly disposed to accept, respect and care for
everyone's being, as they are rendered equal. Equality is not only a part of the legal system,
though. Equality is felt in the actions and interactions, as citizens believe that they share a set
of similar traits such as respect, solidarity, mutual devotion andcompassion. Their life-world is
not segregated into isolated social and cultural universes. Different social and cultural forms of
life are mixed up within the life-world of citizenship. There is not any enclave seen as a safe
haven or a place to go to experience cultural differences. Differences is everywhere in such a
way that they are not being noticed but lived. Citizens as equal yet also different individuals
discover their differences and enjoy living the riches of their society. They learn to think and
create newvalues bytrustingandcaring«the others». Theycome to love «the others».
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Love asa practiceof citizenship asbelongingtoa moral community
Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, a thirteenth century Anatolian philosopher, poet and the
founder of the Mevlevi sect, has many insights to offer for love as a basis for reconstructing
citizenship as belonging to a moral community. He says: «Reason is powerless in the
expression of Love. Love alone is capable of revealing the truth of Love and being a Lover."3
This means that if we want to really knowwhether a lover is indeed in love we must also be
able to fall in love. To see the realityof love we need to experience love. According to Gibbs
(2000: 160-164), love is to lose the sense of making calculations, as love does not growout of
the expectation of gain. As he puts it, «unlike strategic action, [love] cannot calculate howto
PENETRATE, howto influence the other person»(Gibbs, 2000: 162). Love is to encounter
the life as it comes to the individual. It can even be said that love is to lose the sense of self
and eventually become a selfless individual. As again Gibbs (2000:162) states, «loving your
neighbor is acting without control and without knowledges. Here we must emphasize that
the absence of knowledge in the action of the lover is a precondition of love. In other words,
love grows out of not knowing. But how come does one become a person without
knowledge? If we recall the Sarterian concept of bad faith, we can suggest that one loses
his/her knowledge bydenying his/her deceptions, that is, his/her transcendental truths. By
rejecting the truths of his/her deception he/she can reach the truth of love, i.e. being
«knowledgeless», so to speak. This is also to say that lover is the mirror opposite of the
human being who is driven to act towards the other only from his/ her deceptive
transcendental knowledge. As Mevlana may put it in one of his verses, lovers must stop
acting like «intellectuals» who, as part of their social identity, have to keep still and defend
their «rational»positions at all expenses:
The intellectual is always showingoff, the lover is always gettinglost The
intellectual runs away, afraid of drowningThe whole business of love is to
drown in the sea.
The metaphor sea here refers to the other. Thus love is to drown in the other. Love is to
die in the other while the other dies in the self. Lovers help each other to kill their «selves»
and reach a state of freedom in their love. That is why Mevlana thinks that lovers become
coffins for each other:
The coffin seems a jail, yet it means freedom. Which seed fell
in the earth that did not growthere? Why do you doubt the
fate of human seed? What bucket came not filled from out the
cistern?
Love is to open the individual up for possibilities and see the life as a place for the human
being to experience freely, and without any precondition create and grow. In short, love
helps
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us overcome our self-deception or bad faith. Those who are practicing bad faith can never
become critical of their transcendental truths. They cannot change their behavior because they
cannot forget what they come to believe as the true knowledge of life. They are not practical
but always theoretical. They are heartless, so to speak. They cannot love anything or anybody
even though theymayclaim that theylove their nation, for instance. Theyare, in the words of
Nietzsche, condemnedto live anddie as «slaves».
Nietzsche, similar to Sartre, departs from the presumption that freedom is nothingness. He
conceives resentment as the opposite of freedom. From these two opposing conditions he
derives two opposing systems of morality. The first, which he refers to as the slave morality,
divides the world into two realms with respect to the notions of «good» and «evil,» which are
taken as transcendences- good being the truth and «us,» "friends,» "comrades» and evil being
falsehood and «others,» "enemies,» "foes.» This follows from the fact that the slave morality
«fromthe outset says No to what is «outside,»what is different,»what is «not itself»andthis No
is its creative deed.» In order to make one be able to say No to «others,» this morality bestows
fixity of being on oneself. The slave morality, if we want to use Sartre's expressions, gives the
self «an unbroken continuity of existence in itself.» It is this foundationalism inherent in the
slave morality that puts it in sharp contrast with the second type of morality, that is, the noble
morality.
The noble morality d^evelops from a triumphant affirmation of itself.» As Nietzsche depicts,
individuals of the noble morality do not «establish their happiness artificially, by examining their
enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they [are] happy.» (Nietzsche 1992:474)
In this sense, the noble morality does not need a fixed hostile external world, an ultimate reality, to
which one may approach from a fixed mode of«good» being. The noble is capable offorgeting his/ her
knowledge and acquire newknowledge. Because this become his/ her basic principle his/ her morality
emerges from nothingness to end up attaining in nothingness without fear — to reach the assertion
that «we no longer have anything left to fear in man. "(Nietzsche 1992: 479) Thus, for individuals
of the noble morality what is «outside,» "what is different,» "what is not itself» can only provide an
opportunity for gettingnewknowledge about diversityand richness of human existence. In this sense
the noble individual «desires his enemy for himself as his mark of distinctions (Nietzsche 1992:
475)
These two forms of morality can also be conceived of as two different forms of regulation of
encounters between the self and the other. In this regard, the slave morality denies that there
exists outside of it another truth, with the same reliability, and another and equal morality
capable of heeding the requirements of good life on an equal footing. For the slave morality
the «other» is completely and only an objective position of «what evil is.» As such, it says 'No'
to the other, and bars the other from giving a replythat mayalter its position from within his/
her «consciousness» which, as a matter of fact, does not need the other to reflect on its own
morality. In other words, the slave moralitycloses the communication internallywithin the self
andexternallybetween the self andthe other. It remains deaf to its own ironyin the first place
and, secondly, the irony of humanity as revealed by the opposition between the self and the
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objectivisation of itself and of the other. In brief, the slave morality can do without the
other as positing, as responding, as constructing, and as active honorable «stranger». That
is why to some extent it essentializes itself as good and the others as evil. That is why it
cannot move beyond the «self»and love the other.
The noble moralityoffers an entirelydifferent regulation of encounters between the self and
the other. The primary difference resides in the fact that the noble morality does not
assume an ultimate reality because doing so is to close down the world for oneself, to
remove the possibility of freedom as nothingness- something a noble cannot endure. The
noble rushes forwardto difference, looks for diverse perspectives andvalues, listen to various
replies to his/her questions, just because he/she seeks out self-affirmation that requires an
endless exploration of life. In this sense, the noble morality opens up the communication
both as a form of life [i.e. morality] and as a form of knowing [i.e. epistemology]. We suggest
that the noble moralityallows people to really fall in love, as it requires the self to drown in
the other, and be killed by the other. In brief, the noble morality let the self move in life,
change and be changed. The noble or the lover as a citizen neither runs away when there
are newcomers around nor laments that condition and woefully desires to remove such
«low-life» strangers from his/her ostensible «high life». Instead he enjoys the «common life»
that he/she shares with his/her fellowcitizens.
Some concludingremarks
What we have argued up to this point leads us to conclude that citizenship is an encounter
in and through which individuals learn to share a common life. Citizenship as practical
knowledge in opposition to being a politico-legal system relies on cultural signs and moral
codes, which provide individuals with a meaningful life. Unless individuals gain such a sense
of life, they become alienated from social and moral responsibilities of citizenship. Actually
existing citizenships can indeed be seen as moral orders situated in their particular political
formations. As such they are systems of moral enclosure, which claim to represent the best
form of life for their citizens and the common interests of them. Socialization and social
interaction within the morally closed universe of citizenship make citizens ignorant and
insensitive to other possible moral orders. As long as others with a different moral
conditioning enter their life world, they may not have any particular reason to be interested
in the value of the morality of others (unless, of course, they are «political philosophers"!).
On the contrary, any faint or banal interest that may develop, say through watching sports
or artistic events, is an occasion for them to prove themselves how good they really are.
Things, of course, may radically change if those others become the next-door neighbors.
Now, they are asked to share a common life with all its possibilities and difficulties. Thus the
question is verystraightforward: Are theyreadyto share their common life with them? Or are
theygoing to see them as «low-life»people and treat them as their subordinates? As we have
emphasized, the likelihood that they resist sharing their conditions of life is veryhigh. So we
are not facing here only a theoretical question. Indeed we are looking to the common
individuals living as neighbors but divided by feelings of superiority/inferiority. In other
words, we are looking at citizenship as a practice.
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We need to find a practical answer to a practical question. We must be somewhat pragmatist.
As pragmatists may suggest, we have to find out a solution to overcome «foundationalism»
and «essentialism» in the everyday life knowledge and actions of citizens. We argue that any
search for a solution to this impasse requires conceiving citizenship as an affective and emo-
tional relationship among citizens. Once we understand the significance of emotions, we can
see that love as a strong emotion mayhelp overcome the division within the citizenship along
the axes of high-life/lowlife andfacilitate the emergence of a sharedsense of common life.
Love is anti-foundationalist and hence anti-essentialist. Unlike essentialism, love does not
assign fixity of being both to the self and the other. Love makes one accept that he/she does
not knowanything about the other. Love, if you will, erases all deceptive knowledge one may
have about the other, and thus preparing the self for «wanting to know» the other. By doing
so, love breaks the unbreakable belief in the superiority of one's own self and, say, his/her
culture, ethnicity, nation, gender, etc. For the lover, the next-door stranger is an occasion for
forgetting what he/she deceptively think he/she is. The other is a mirror to him/her showing
what one has been assuming to be. Love helps us to be, as in one of the American TV shows,
a «newme»in a double sense. First, we become more aware of what values we do cherish and
even want to die for. In this first sense, we come to knowwhat is central for us to be able to
call ourselves as human beings. Second, we can understand that we could be completely
different yet have missed that chance because we were unaware of other forms of imaging a
good life. This does not mean that we maywant to live like the others nowappearing to us as
our mirrors. Although this maybe a possibility, there is much more than this in our discovery
of the others. We can gain the practical knowledge that there are endless possibilities of
imaging for forming a good life. Needless to say, one such possibilityis of imagining living with
the strange neighbor. So again, what is the practical solution? We must have the courage to say
to our youth and ourselves: «We really do not know who these strange neighbors are». We
believe, Nietzsche wanted us to understand this simple possibilityand bywriting always aimed
to empower us so that we could, one day, undermine the will to power of slaves.
NOTES
1 Nothing, they knownothing
They don't want to know
2 All of the messages cited here are taken from the webpage:
http://www.expatica.com/source/forum thread.asp-
?charmel icr=2&thread id-22990
3 Mevlana's verses cited here are all taken from Schimmel (1991).
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